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1. Responsible subjectivity in Feyerabend
1.1. A crucial feature of Feyerabend’s epistemological project, as set out 
in Against Method in 1975, is without doubt the concept of irrationality. The 
au thor holds this concept to be exempt from what he saw as »the paradox 
of m odern irrationalism «1.
This paradox lies in the fact that »its proponents silently identify ration­
alism with o rder and articulate speech and thus see themselves forced to 
prom ote stam m ering and absurdity«2. This results in various forms of mys­
ticism and existentialism, which reduce man »to a whining stream of con­
sciousness«3 opening the doors to the Absurd, the Other. Let us make it clear 
that Feyerabend does no t reject mysticism tout-court. Using arguments sim­
ilar to those o f Winch on magic in »Understamding a primitive Society«4 
he deplores those forms o f Western mysticism and existentialism which he 
considers to be an unjustifiable flight from reason, perform ed by those who 
share rationalism ’s conviction that the only possible rational discourse is the 
rationalist one. He believes he can offer us a different perspective, or rath­
er a plurality of perspectives, within which rationalism is no t absent but, so 
far from m onopolising, and thus reducing to itself, the them e of rationali­
ty, is able to find a new place for itself in the historical-cultural context. 
W ithout feelings o f guilt with respect to any particular methodology or cul­
ture, Feyerabend’s irrationalism  does not seek therefore an escape into the 
a-rational, it does no t drown in the abysses of the Other, nor does it yield to 
the calls of a certain existentialism of the Self; pu t simply it remains open 
to the »otherwise«, to that which differs. This »otherwise«, as it takes shape, 
is no t theorized; it does not, that is, become a philosophy of difference. He 
does n o t try to resolve the m eaning of otherness into the formulas of some 
philosophical assertion, but rather moves towards an awareness o f the ex-
1 P. K. Feyerabend, Against Method, NLB, London, 1975, p. 218.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 P. W inch, »U nderstanding a primitive Society«, American Philosophical Quarterly, ( 1 /  
1964).
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istence of other forms of life different from our own and the necessity, con­
sequent on this, of a methodological and gnosiological pluralism. Feyer­
abend does not believe that this problem  concerns the scientific sphere 
alone. His project, let us not forget, has a twin purpose; on the one hand 
that of freeing science from the threatening and arrogant hold o f the m eth­
odologists, who would sacrifice its originality and creativity on the altar of 
truth o f some or other Method; on the other, that o f freeing m an from the 
hold of science itself, from its pervasive Titanism, its need for truth, by re­
m inding him of the plurality of perspectives within which his hum anity can 
express itself.
»A society that is based on a set o f well-defined and restrictive rules so 
that being a manbecomes synonymus with obeying these rules, forces the dis­
senter into a no-man’s-land of no rules at all and thus robs him of his reason and 
his humanity.«-' Thus for Feyerabend irrationality is no t so m uch the choice 
of the dissenter, who through the richness of his o r her hum anity challeng­
es the rules imposed by the rationalist m odel, as the condition, the threat, 
the blackmail, the sentence which the rationalist m odel passes on those it 
calls irrational, the banishm ent of those who do not accept its rules to a ter­
ritory with no rules at all. In the same way the Romans used the term »bar­
barian« for anybody outside the borders o f its em pire. W hat we have said is 
fundamental for an understanding of one of the crucial points that the critics 
have insisted on: Anything goesl In reality, a t various points in Erkenntnis fu r  
freie Menschen6, the author had gone to some pains to make clear that »Any­
thing Goes« did not constitute the »principle« o f his new methodology, bu t 
rather, the way in which the traditional rationalists would probably describe 
his way of representing traditions, their interactions and their development.
He does not therefore defend the cause of irrationalism, except, as he 
said in Against Method, in the sense of an »undercover agent who plays the 
game of Reason in order to undercut the authority o f Reason (Truth, H on­
esty, Justice, and so on)«7. Rational and irrational are merely two two sides 
of the same rationalist coin that always asks us to play the same game of heads 
or tails; ‘Either with me or against m e’. Feyerabend holds that the game can 
be changed, but in order to do so, to be able to rise above this stifling dual­
ism, one m ust be able to examine it from outside. Now, the outside to which 
Feyerabend refers is not the mystic or the rational’s »Other«, bu t rather, as 
we said at the beginning, that which differs.
5 P. K. Feyerabend, Against Method, op. cit, p. 218.
fl Cf. P. K. Feyerabend, Erkenntnis fur freie Menschen, Suhram p Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 
1980, Part I, cap., 6-7.
7 P. K. Feyerabend, Against Method, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
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1.2. The possibility of placing oneself outide rationalist dicourse does 
not constitute for the au thor the assertion of a principle, an abstract ideal. 
Anthropology and history provide us with numerous examples of rational 
alternatives to contem porary western rationalism, but to be able to make use 
of these one m ust be open to a democratic relativism. We should immediately 
make clear that for the au tho r relativism is an alternative instrum ent of 
com prehension to rationalism and empiricism, as is logic, and not a truth 
capable o f em bracing the others thereby reducing them to itself. The exist­
ence of som ething other than onself than one’s own culture, and the possi­
bility o f referring to this, does not make the choice banal, or detract from 
its dramatic quality. In the same way it does not render all possibilities equally 
valid, otherwise the difference would vanish into the eternally Equal, throw­
ing Relativism into the dogm a of the Ulimate Truth, forcing it into a paral- 
izing scepticism. His relativism, which, it is worth clarifying immediately, was 
to live through many seasons before being dropped, at least as a term, to­
gether with objectivism in that it had become a diversion, from the begin­
ning displayed a num ber o f features.
The relativism which he defended concerns traditions but also opinions, 
concepts and theories, inasm uch as these have a m eaning only within a giv­
en tradition. The accusation o f subjectivism, made explicitly or implicitly by 
authors who, like Putnam , have taken literally »Anythinggoes«, is therefore 
unjust. In fact Feyerabend, without actually ever declaring himself to be a 
follower o f W ittgeinstein always acknowledged the debt he owed to the great 
Austrian philosopher, who was noted for having m aintained the impossibil­
ity of a private language. Furtherm ore, that other figure of great inspiration 
for Feyerabend’s relativism, B. Lee Whorf, m aintained the dependence of 
individuals on the gram m ar of the different cultures in which they express 
their ideas. Thus he stressed the necessity of comparison with o ther gram­
mars and cultures in o rder to know the limits of one’s own. No subjectivism 
then, no t even in this case, and no solipsism either. It is however im portant 
to underline here how the Subject in Feyerabend does not disappear in his 
discourse, is no t annihilated in a kind of grammatical or semantic determ in­
ism. The Subject in Feyerabend is active. It is down to him to articulate within 
himself the greatest num ber of languages with the aim o f constructing not 
a secret code, which even he would not be able to master, like the solipsist 
which W ittgenstein talks of, but an individuality in which the experience of 
the world may be personalized.
O n the o ther hand, pluralism does not mean placing all cultures on 




Feyerabend, in fact, did not in tend to affirm that all traditions have the 
same value or that they are in any case equally true. W hat he sought to make 
clear was that the possibility of judging the various traditions originates from 
the comparison with other traditions since traditions, considered by them ­
selves, are neither good nor bad.
Pluralism, relativism and irrationalism are simply the different terms 
applied by Feyerabend to the freedom of choice. O n the freedom  of choice, 
inherent in his democratic relativism, is founded the possibility itself of a 
subjective responsibility. He was in fact to ask himself, in his autobiography if 
it is possible to have a responsibility without choice. To construct or suggest 
alternatives to one’s own system of values and truths represents an ethical 
(in that it is consciously chosen) way of living out on e’s own humanity, since 
»La responsabilité presuppone ehe si conoscano alternative, ehe si sappia 
come scegliere fra loro« (»responsability presupposes that alternatives are 
known, [and] that one knows how to chose between them .«)8 The respon­
sibility which the author speaks of evidently m ust no t be confused with any 
kind of legal or ethical responsibility, in that these are imposed on us from 
without; by the laws, through the courts, and by ethics through cultural in­
doctrination. Subjective responsibility is the fruit of individual action, of the 
choice between different options. O ne is responsible to oneself and to o th ­
ers in that one’s actions derive from a choice. As we can see, responsible 
action in this sense does not derive from ethics but creates it, so to speak, as 
the problem  of the relations between responsible agents. W ithin a single 
tradition it is not possible to speak of true responsibility, but of objectivity. The 
participant will be held responsible in relation to the options that his or her 
tradition offers. The responsible subject allows the ethical certainties that 
he shares with the community to vacillate, and takes upon himself the dra­
matic nature of the choice. The freedom  that the author thus refers to how­
ever, is certainly no t Liberty: another hypostasis in the grey vista offered by 
the eternal truths. Freedom for Feyerabend is always som ething concrete, 
something which finds its expression and its limits in the com parison be­
tween different cultures and different m oments of their history. In the same 
way, he does not aspire to any kind of primitivism, an im probable re tu rn  to 
an idealized and therefore abstract nature, incapable of justifying the orig­
inality and the specificity inherent in being a person.
To be free therefore, does not m ean an absence o f rules, in that free­
dom is awareness in their use. To be able to act means to be free only inso­
far as one has this awareness and within this awareness one seeks the best
8 P. K. Feyerabend, Ammazzando il tempo. U n’autobiografia, Laterza, Bari, 1994, p. 198.
(O ur translation)
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conditions for expressing oneself. An amoeba is no t free in that it has no 
awareness of its own actions -  if it did it would probably recoil in horro r at 
the rigid rules which determ ine its behaviour in all situations. In the same 
way, Feyerabend recoils in horro r at rationalist determinism. But in that case 
it is precisely conscious (aware) action which raises choice to the level of 
freedom  and ushers in the ethical m om ent of responsibility. To be free 
means to be aware of the language that one adopts, of the culture that one 
expresses, of the aims which one desires to pursue. To do this it is initially 
necessary to step outside of o n e ’s own language, one’s own culture, one’s 
own ideology. T hat is to say, one must transform oneself from participant 
into observer. By this m ovem ent the subject introduces choice, and with it 
responsibility. Feyerabend’s relativism, as we have already said, not only does 
not lead to scepticism but, consistent with his own critical development, he 
opposes it in that it constitutes an implicit refusal of one’s freedom of choice. 
Feyerabend’s relativism aspires to the construction of a subject whose auton­
omy is responsible action in the historico-cultural situation in which he ac­
tually expresses himself and achieves. In a certain way Feyerabend is propos­
ing that we adopt the idea o f a knowledge in questioning, a philosophy of 
doubt. Not the hyperbolic doubt of Descartes, who finds peace in the ulti­
mate tru th  of the cogito, and which is at the origin of m odern rationalism, 
but the Socratic dialogue, which is at the origin of ethics and which does 
not seek conclusions but wishes to be open; capable of infinite reformula­
tion. This does no t m ean that it is inconclusive, but always, dramatically 
present. The dialogue we speak of is that which lies at the origin of philo­
sophical thinking, peculiar to everyone who desires to know himself, rather 
than philosophical thought, by which is m eant the historically determ ined 
result of the activity of a category of specialists.
2. Putnam: internalism and relativism
In Reason Truth And History Putnam  had explicitly declared that he 
wanted to defend the internalist perspective, »because it is characteristic of 
this view to hold that what objects does the world consist ofi is a question that it 
only makes sense to ask within a theory or description of the world«9. In cit­
ing this position the autore distinguishes it from relativism, with which some 
may try to associate it. The definition that follows makes it clear that the 
reference is no t to just any kind of relativism but particularly to Feyerabend’s.




»Internalism is no t a facile relativism that says, ‘Anything goes’«. He contin­
ues, »denying that it makes sense to ask whether our concepts ‘m atch’ some­
thing totally uncontam inated by conceptualization is one thing; b u t to hold 
that every conceptual system is therefore ju st as good as every o ther would 
be something else«10. Given what we attem pted to clarify in the preceding 
paragraph regarding Feyerabend’s irrationalism we feel it necessary to re­
ject, as being completely beside the point, both the reference to the acco­
modating dimension of »anything goes« and the presum ed absence o f discrim­
ination between the various conceptual systems. We would like however, to 
dwell a while longer on the difference between internalism  and relativism 
in order to clarify the distinctive goals which the two authors pursue, there­
by illuminating, perhaps, the crux o f their polemic.
We may assume that Feyerabend would have subscribed to Putnam ’s 
declaration. That is, he would have considered it necessary to distinguish 
his own position from any and all forms o f internalism.
In the notes to »Marxist Fairytales from  Australia«, written in reply to 
J. Curthoys and W. Suchting, and published in Inquiry in 1977, he had main­
tained that the notion that we see reality in the terms of our own concepts 
amounts to a special case, citing various articles in which he had tackled the 
question. However, the most interesting aspect as far as our argum ent is 
concerned may be found a little fu rther on in note 36, where the author 
argues the necessity, if one intends to examine traditions from the »inside«, 
of adopting the ideas and procedures utilized by those who participate in 
those traditions. Reconstructing their phenom enological world evidently 
means trying to see the world as they see it. This is no t the same thing as 
supporting internalism, in that if they do no t distinguish the real from  the 
theoretical, then neither should we. Feyerabend distinguishes this kind of 
analysis from  those he calls »symptomatic readings« which deal with exter­
nal criteria n .
For Putnam the task of internalism was to avoid the so-called Eye of God 
problem posed by Metaphysical Realism and Metaphysical Relativism. This 
is the conviction that one can supply an external vision (from which exter- 
nalism) of reality. The passage cited, however, implicitly accuses internalism  
of wishing to provide a fully comprehensive reading o f the problem atic re­
lationship that each culture establishes with reality, and in this sense, o f rec­
reating the Eye of God problem. However the most im portant thing that seems 
to emerge from this passage is that if in exam ining traditions from the in­
10 Ibid., p. 54.
11 Cf. P. K. F eyerabend , »M arxist F airy ta les from  A ustralia« , Inquiry, vol. 20, 
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo (2-3, 1977), p. 396 .
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side we must take into account their vision of the world, then not only in­
ternalism, but also relativism can and must be valued on a case by case ba­
sis. This is no t at all inconsistent, since for Feyerabend the disputes betwen 
realists and relativists, internalists and externalists, etcetera make firm sense 
solely within the specific context of Western culture. For other cultures or 
traditions these disputes m ight appear otiose or irrelevant.
W hat we have said shou ld  clarify a po in t which Putnam  has often 
stressed, attributing to Feyerabend the point of greatest inconsistency of the 
relativist position:
»That (total) relativism is inconsistent is a truism am ong philosophers. 
After all, is it no t obviously contradictory to hold a point o f view while at the 
same time holding that no point of view is no m ore justified or right then 
any other?«12 He then concludes »the im portant point to notice is that if all 
is relative, then the relative is relative too«13.
Before continuing it will be as well to underline that, as we have seen, 
even for the relativist Feyerabend relativism must itself be relative, but while 
for him  the conclusion represents an elem ent of consistency within his own 
position, for Putnam  this conclusion constitutes the decisive elem ent o f in­
consistency for the confutation of the validity of the relativist argum ent, 
whose acceptance would cause our very com prehension to vacillate. The 
crucial point is that the inconsistency to which Putnam refers is logical, while 
the consistency to which Feyerabend appeals is historico-anthropological.
Citing the polemic between Protagoras and Plato Putnam says that »if 
every statem ent X means ‘I think thatX ’, then I should (on Protagoras’ view) 
really say (1)1 think that I th ink that snow is white But the process o f add­
ing ‘I th ink’ can always be iterated! In Prothagoras’ view, the ultimate m ean­
ing o f ‘snow is white’ is then not (1) but (2) I think that I think that I think 
that I... (with infinitely many I thinks’) that snow is white. This Plato took to 
be a reductio ad absurdum.« But Plato’s argument is faulty; indeed, »why should 
Protagoras no t agree that his analysis applies to itself?«14 In reality it seems 
that ne ither o f the in terpretations adapt well to Feyerabend’s relativism 
which, distinguishing between the participant’s questions and those o f the 
observer, holds that one has ‘objectivity’ when the participant in a tradition 
is no t aware o f it and thus does not m ention it in his judgem ents.15 This 
position, also appears to be very close to the interpretation of Wittgenstein- 
ian anthropology provided by Bouveresse, for whom the need to in terpret
12 H. Putnam , op cit., p. 119.
13 Ibid, p. 120.
14 Ibid.
15 Cf. P. K. Feyerabend, Erkenntnis fu r  freie Menschen, op. cit., Parte, II, Cap. 3.
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a language can exist solely for som eone who (for an instant o r perm anen t­
ly) finds himself outside it; this need can be satisfied and vanish only when 
one feels completely at one’s ease in that language, when one has appro­
priated it, in short when one speaks it .16
In this case the participant will question him self simply on how to act 
in certain situations and using the term  »snow« in the terms of his own cul­
ture he will simply think »snow is white«. The observer, w hether he be the 
component of another culture or belong to a certain tradition, who, for some 
reason has placed himself in the ‘no-m an’s lan d ’ spoken of earlier, will ap­
ply his own considerations to his own culture. However, his new condition 
will render him extraneous to his own tradition, and thus he will simply say 
‘I thought the snow was white’. The reductio ad absurdum can be avoided in 
that the sentence should be reform ulated in these terms: (3) ‘I think that 
you think (or that I thought) that the snow was w hite’.
Thus I  can never be the object of my reflection while I  think something as a com­
ponent of a traditione or culture, in that to think as a participant in a tradition means 
to act, even in linguistic terms, as a participant in that tradition. The moment I  
withdraw from it I  no longer think within that culture but about that culture.
In the same way, Feyerabend’s position dodges Putnam ’s o ther attack: 
considering Plato’s argum ent against relativism to be insufficient, he believes 
he can obtain greater enlightenm ent from  W ittgenstein who extended it to 
the argum ent on private language. However, as has been often repeated, and 
contrary to what Putnam continues to assert17, Feyerabend does no t consid­
er the subjectivism of the methodological solipsist possible in the least. Fey­
erabend’s relativism, as with irrationalism, isjust as far from Realism as Rel­
ativism, in his eyes a sort of »Stammering Realism« in tended  to supply a 
different, bu t no less dogmatic, theory of Everything. Feyerabend’s relativ­
ism is aware of being the expression of a culture and that its assertions may 
find no space in other cultures. His relativism is not relative to itself, but to the 
Western culture of which it is an expression. Perhaps for this reason as well he 
m aintained in his autobiography that »obiettivismo e relativismo sono non 
solo insostenibili come filosofie, ma anche cattive guide per una collaborazi- 
one culturale fruttuosa« (»objectivism and relativism are not only un sustain­
able as philosophies, but also poor guides for a fruitful cultural collabora­
tion«)18.
16 Cf J. Bouveresse, »W ittgenstein antropologo«, in Note sul »Ramo d ’oro« di Frazer, 
Adelphi, Milano, 1992, p, 73.
17 Cf. H. Putnam, Realism with a Human Face, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Cap. 
VII, 1990.
18 P. K  Feyerabend, Ammazzando il tempo, op. cit., p. 171. (O ur translation)
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3. Rorty and ethnocentrism
In the work o f Rorty, as in that of Feyerabend, one notes the need for 
an invented subjectivity, constructed via the redescription and redefinition 
of o n e ’s own vocabolary. T here are, however, im portant differences.
At once symbol and creator of subjective redescription, for Rorty, is the 
liberal ironist »I borrow my definition of ‘liberal’ from Judith Shklar, who says 
that liberals are the people who think that cruelty is the worst thing we do.
I use ‘ironist’ to nam e the sort of person who faces up to the contingency 
of his or her own most central beliefs and desires -  som eone sufficiently 
historicist and nom inalist to have abandoned the idea that those central 
beliefs and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and 
chance. Liberal ironists are people who include among these ungrounda- 
ble desires their own hope that suffering will be diminished, that the humil­
iation o f hum an beings by o ther beings may cease.«19
Despite probably not agreeing with the statement in which the liberal 
boasts a m onopoly on disapproval of cruelty, Feyerabend would generally 
have acknowledged the necessity of acting against repression and murder, 
without giving credit to the ethnic justifications of tyrants and assassins20. 
There is one point however, with which he would definitely not have agreed; 
Rorty’s enthusiasm with respect to the intellectuals, about whom Feyerabend 
had written: »Si tratta di una comunità molto speciale, che scrive in un modo 
spéciale, ha opinioni speciali e sembra considerare se stessa come unica 
rappresentante legittima délia razza umana, il che in pratica significa solo 
altri intellettuali.« (»We are talking about a very special community, that 
writes in a special way, has special opinions and seems to consider itself as 
the sole legitim ate representative of the hum an race, which in practice 
means ju st o ther intellectuals«)21.
This polemic should no t be taken lightly, considering that in Contin­
gency, Irony, and solidarity, the liberal ironist is frequently identified with the 
intellectual. Besides, Rorty was not unaware of the accusations of elitism that 
had been levelled at him  also by o ther critics, and in the work cited he gives 
an answer, which however, is no t particularly convincing. In fact, one has the 
impression that some highly generic statements are transformed into argu­
m ents in favour, while the conclusions end up by producing the opposite 
result, reinforcing the reader’s conviction that for the author the role of the
10 R. Rorty, Contingency, irony, and solidarity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1989, p. XV.
20 Cf. P. K. Feyerabend, Ammazzando il tempo, op. cit., p. 171.
21 Ibid. p. 165. (O ur translation)
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intellectual as the guide of humanity, is no t ju st ideal, but also utopian and 
thus to be hoped for: »We tend to assume that nom inalism  and historicism 
are the esclusive property of intellectuals, of high culture, and that the masses 
cannot be so blasé about their own final vocabularies. But rem em ber that 
once upon a time atheism, too, was the exclusive property o f intellectuals. 
In the ideal liberal society, the intellectuals would still be ironists, although 
the nonintellectuals would not. The latter would, however, be comm onsen- 
sically nom inalist and historicist.«22
It seems that the intellectual we are talking about here, who is no t de­
scribed further, should no be confused with those who perform  activities 
commonly assumed to be »intellectual«, for example the professions. In fact, 
he seems to be linked to the intellect in a m ore intim ate way, freed from 
bodily limitations, in a sort of heavenly dim ension with respect to the every­
day. For this reason he constitutes the reconnaissance o f humanity, the one 
who has the task of paving the way o f com m on sense. Thus considered, sub­
jectivity and responsibility as possible choices becom e the exclusive prerog­
ative of the intellectual class.
Up to a point this may be witnessed in the effective difficulty experi­
enced by the many in the daily task o f redescription of their individual vo- 
cabolaries. This is because most people apprehend  the contingeny in the 
unsophisticated forms of their daily needs, the irony in the necessity o f re­
describing every day their own dreams with the relative vocabolary in o rder 
to adapt it to the political and economic necessities with which they come 
into contact. Of course, these forms o f cruelty may be condem ned by the 
liberal ironist, even though they are regularly practiced within the most ef­
ficient liberal Western cultures, in that they would prevent the subject from 
redscribing itself. However, anybody who participates, even against his will, 
in the real progression of history (realm  this context m eaning »the taste of 
bread«) tries, depending on a series of individual variables, to intervene in 
this reality redescribing it in any way he can (by changing job , stealing or 
becoming a prostitute, but also by forming associations, collecting signatures, 
dem anding the intervention of the istitutions, etcetera.). The description 
of oneself and that of the reality in which one operates are pieces of the same 
puzzle. This is not the case for the liberal ironist who, having tackled an 
eminently philosophical problem, that o f the critique of the final vocabu­
lary, holds that the goal to pursue to the bitter end is re-re-redescription: 
»For us ironists, nothing can serve as a criticism of a final vocabulary save 
another such vocabulary; there is no answer to a redescription save a re-re­
22 R. Rorty, op. cit. p. 87.
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redescription.«23 However, a redescription designed exclusively to reiterate 
its own m eaning in a fu rther redescription ends up by betraying its own 
historicist and pragmatist aspects, in that it loses sight of the context in which 
the vocabulary should be used, and thus, its utility. Decontextualized and 
æstheticized, the vocabulary of the ironist risks falling into solipsism or at 
any rate a practice reserved for the initiated. The dignified detachm ent of 
the metaphysical philosophers, scorned by Rorty for being intent on chas­
ing after the Truth, seems to re-emerge in his project of a »proliferating 
realization o f Freedom «24. Shut up, like Faust, in his library, intent on mys­
terious semantic alchemies, he does not hear the voices in the street an­
nouncing the feast. Absolutely indifferent to hum an events, he carries on a 
»dialogue« with the only interlocutors in which he is really interested: his 
books.
»Since there is nothing beyond vocabularies which serves as a criticism 
is a m atter o f looking on this picture and on that, not of comparing both 
pictures with the original. Nothing can serve as a criticism of a person save 
ano ther person, or of a culture save an alternative culture -  for persons and 
cultures are, for us, incarnated vocabularies. So our doubts about our own 
characters or our own cultures can be resolved or assuaged only by enlarg­
ing our acquaintance. The easiest way of doing that is to read books, and so 
ironists spend m ore of their time placing books than in placing real live 
people.«25
Despite the allusion to comparison with other people and other cultures, 
the ironist does not consider himself a relativist. He is rather a supporter of 
ethnocentrism , for which reason there is nothing to say about truth and ra­
tionality, beyond the description of our culture, as he himself makes clear.2fi
Rorty s ethnocentrism , the (ripe) fruit of his pragmatism, seems to the 
form ulation we gave of Feyerabend’s relativism. A relativism for which the 
validity o f certain questions cannot be stated in absolute terms, bu t only 
relative to our culture.
However, in contrast with Rorty, for Feyerabend the pragmatist attitude 
makes it feasable to overcome ethnocentrism. This position is more or less 
explicitly m aintained in Science in a Free Society where, using the m etaphor 
of the »traveller«, the figure of the participant pragmatist is described.27 This
23 Ibid, p. 80.
24 Ibid, p. XVI.
25 Ibid, p. 80.
20 Cf. J. Raichman, C. West (Eds), Post-Analytic Philosophy, Columbia University Press, 
New York 1985, p. 5.
27 P. K. Feyerabend, Erkenntnis fu r  freie Menschen, op. cit., Part I, cap. 2.
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kind o f pragmatist considers the traditions in the same way as a traveller 
considers the places in which stays for a period of time. He evaluates its pros 
and cons, but is fundamentally prepared  to question the certainties with 
which he began his journey, arriving at a point where he can modify his own 
»nature«, which he holds to be just another tradition. This type of difference, 
between the pragmatism of Rorty and that o f Feyerabend, helps us to un ­
derstand why Rorty is able to justly claim near identity with the internalism  
put forward by Putnam in Reason, Truth, and History,28
In Rorty the idea o f the traveller is absent, and with it the responsibil­
ity that each person has to use their own liberty to its limits, to the po in t of 
changing one’s own nature. Subjectivity for Feyerabend however, is born of 
the crisis of those certainties of which the subject believes him self to be the 
bearer, and as such is fundam ental to the creation o f responsible subjectiv­
ity. The liberal ironist on the o ther hand, while supporting pluralism, stays 
behind the wall of certainties that separates him  perm anently from what, out 
of prejudice, he is no t willing to become: a non-liberal. He (and the tradi­
tion he represents) is never that which is questioned; it is never his liberal 
Western nature that is at risk. Thus conceived, the dialogue which he pro­
poses loses the charm  of a journey, reducing itself to a sort o f cultural tour­
ism. Keeping the m etaphor of the traveller, one could say that Rorty is p re­
pared to leave for o ther destinations, but only as long as he has already re­
served his return ticket. He may be com pared to one o f those tourists who, 
when faced with any m onum ent and, m ore generally, anything expressing 
the tradition of the country where they are currently staying, continue to 
make comparisons with the constructions and glories o f their own country. 
O f course, they may also try some of the local food, but compared to theirs...! 
Thus they end up by collecting the most ridiculous »souvenirs«, vulgar re­
minders of clumsy excursions to foreign lands.
Seen in this light the dialogue with o ther cultures, which actually has a 
substantial part in Rorty’s philosophy, becomes, or at least risks becoming, 
all one way, reducing itself to wise discussions am ong the m em bers o f the 
intellectual circuit; sophisticated reciters, painstaking critics, original circum­
navigators of meaning, ready to spot unsuspected references, and joyful 
quotations.
In sum, ethnocentrism  has m uch that is consistent with internalism ; 
both are indifferent to the point o f view of participants in o ther traditions 
(unless these are willing to let themselves be colonized by their explana­
tions), and therefore to the creation of a responsible subjectivity and free 
of ethnic prejudices.
28 Cf. J. Raichman, C. West, op. cit., p. 6.
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A final consideration
The content of the individual responsible subjectivity, belonging as much 
to the level o f o n e ’s account o f oneself as to the relations with others, con­
stitutes the unique and unrepeatable event par excellence. It can never be fully 
accounted for in an exposition that deals with subjectivity in general and for 
this reason it has never been the object of our discussion. As has been said 
already, ou r aim was exclusively to make use o f the »ford« offered to the 
discussion on subjectivity by the work of Feyerabend. After all, it is in the 
nature o f fords that they provide an uncomfortable and slippery crossing 
and tend  with the passage of time to disappear, in such a way that each trav­
eller will be obliged to find his own, as occasion demands.
Translated by George Metcalf
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